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1.1  Introduction 
In the last thirty years several OECD economies have  accumulated large 
public debts. In fact, table 1.1 shows a very large variance in debt/GNP ratios 
in OECD countries, much larger today than twenty years ago. Several countries 
exhibit debt/GNP ratios close to or even greater than 100 percent, while others 
have ratios of about 30 percent. The increase in public debts has been accompa- 
nied by  a marked transformation in the composition of government outlays. 
While twenty years ago purchases of goods and services were predominant in 
government budgets, in the last twenty years transfer programs have  grown 
much more rapidly than government purchases of goods and services. Trans- 
fers are notoriously more difficult to cut; therefore this evolution of the compo- 
sition of expenditures makes fiscal adjustments in the face of high debts partic- 
ularly difficult. 
In a previous paper (Alesina and Perotti  1995b) we asked two questions: 
(1) Why did certain countries accumulate large public debts while others did 
not? and (2)  Why did these large debts appear in the last twenty years but 
not before? 
In that paper we argued that economic variables alone cannot provide sat- 
isfactory answers to  these  questions, and  we  considered several politico- 
institutional explanations. In particular, we emphasized the role of  electoral 
systems, party structure, government fragmentation, and political polarization. 
For instance, we agreed with those authors' who have argued that coalition 
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governments, typical  of countries with proportional  electoral systems, tend 
to delay fiscal adjustments, so that public debts accumulate more rapidly in 
these countries. 
In this paper we focus more specifically on “budgetary institutions,” defined 
as all the rules and regulations according to which budgets are prepared, ap- 
proved, and carried out. 
Our goal is to understand whether the budget procedures have significant 
macroeconomic effects on the size and composition of the budget and on the 
budget balance.2 Specifically, we pose two related questions: (a)  To what ex- 
tent do budget institutions explain fiscal policy outcomes, and particularly, the 
budget balance? Can budget institutions explain why certain high-debt coun- 
tries have more difficulties in adjusting than others? (b)  What are the most 
effective budget procedures to insure “fiscal responsibility”? We conclude that 
fiscal institutions are important determinants of fiscal outcomes. In Poterba’s 
(1996) words, “although the evidence is not conclusive, the preponderance of 
studies suggest that institutions are not simply veils . . .  but are important con- 
straints  .” 
This paper is organized as follows. Section  1.2 describes and summarizes 
our basic argument and provides an overview of the paper. This section briefly 
touches upon several issues that are then addressed in more detail in the follow- 
ing sections. Section 1.3  reviews the theoretical literature, and section 1.4 dis- 
cusses the issues and problems left unsolved. Section 1.5  tackles a difficult but 
important issue, namely the transparency of the budget. Section 1.6 reviews 
the empirical literature that can shed light on our two questions. 
1.2  Budgetary Institutions: An Overview 
This section describes our basic argument and provides an overview of the 
entire paper. 
1.2.1  Are Institutions Endogenous? 
Budgetary institutions are all the rules and regulations according to which 
budgets are drafted, approved, and implemented. Since these institutions vary 
across countries, and, to a lesser extent, over time, they can be used as an ex- 
planation of cross-country differences in fiscal policy. 
An obvious objection to this research strategy is that institutions are them- 
selves endogenous. In particular, institutions may be changed as a result of 
unsatisfactory fiscal performance, and the choice of different institutions may 
in this volume) for empirical work and Spolaore 1993 and Velasco (chap. 2 in this volume) for 
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be a function of  other socio-political-historical  variables that may  influence 
both the institutional choice and the fiscal outcome. If  this is the case, institu- 
tions cannot be used as explanatory variables in regressions where fiscal out- 
comes are on the left-hand side of the equation, which is the procedure adopted 
in much of the empirical literature reviewed below. 
Clearly, to some extent institutions are indeed endogenous, particularly to 
past fiscal outcomes. However, to the extent that institutions are reasonably 
difficult to change, and therefore are changed relatively infrequently, they can 
be considered predetermined, at least in the short-to-medium run. In  other 
words, since it is costly and complex to change institutions, the existing ones 
have to be very unsatisfactory before it is worth changing them; as a result, 
there is a strong “status quo” bias in institutional reforms. Therefore, at least 
up to a point, one can use institutional features as explanatory variables. Never- 
theless we believe that systematic research that tries to explain institutional 
building is overdue and is an excellent area of future work. 
One can distinguish between two types of institutions: laws that prescribe 
numerical targets on the budget, and procedural rules. 
1.2.2  Balanced-Budget Laws 
The most typical example of a “numerical target” is a balanced-budget law. 
Two theoretical arguments suggest that a balanced-budget law would not be 
optimal. The first one is related to stabilization policies. Standard Keynesian 
anticyclical policies prescribe tax cuts, expenditure increases, and deficits in 
recessions and tax increases, expenditure cuts, and surplus in economic booms. 
Note, however, that the feasibility and opportunity of this kind of fine-tuning 
of fiscal policies have been questioned, starting with the famous argument on 
“long and variable lags” by Milton Friedmam4 
A second theoretical argument that runs against the idea of balanced-budget 
laws is the tax-smoothing theory of budget deficits (Barro 1979; Lucas and 
Stokey 1983). According to this theory, budget deficits and surpluses should 
be used to “smooth” the distortionary cost of taxation, so that deficits should 
be permitted when spending is exceptionally and temporarily high, for instance 
during wars, natural calamities, and emergencies, or when revenues are tempo- 
rarily low, for instance during recessions. Thus, a law that prescribes a bal- 
anced budget in every year would excessively constrain the use of budget defi- 
cits and surpluses as the “buffer” needed to implement the optimal tax policy. 
Theoretically, one could think of  a “contingent” budget balance law, with 
escape clauses to permit a certain amount of tax smoothing. However, a well- 
understood argument in the debate on rules versus discretion suggests that 
rules have to be ~imple.~  Complicated rules can be circumvented and present 
4.  Even though Friedman was concerned about monetary policy, his argument applies also to 
5. See, for instance, Tanzi 1993. 
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monitoring problems,  so that in the end they become  almost  useless.  They 
may even be counterproductive if they create incentives to resort to “creative 
budgeting”  and  highly  distorted  policies  chosen  simply  to  circumvent  the 
rules. 
On the other hand,  several arguments suggest that actual policies are not 
dictated by principles of optimal taxation, but are the result of various politi- 
cally induced deficit bias (see the survey in Alesina and Perotti 1995b). In this 
case, a balanced-budget law may be a second-best solution. One would have to 
trade off the distortions of the balanced-budget law on the optimal tax policies, 
against the reduction of politically induced distortions on actual policies. 
This paper argues that balanced-budget laws at the national level are neither 
necessary nor sufficient to insure fiscal discipline. We argue that appropriute 
procedures may not require numerical targets, so that one may maintain flexi- 
bility on the budget balance front (needed to implement tax-smoothing policies 
or stabilization policies) without giving up fiscal discipline. To evaluate this 
claim, we now turn to an overview of procedural issues. 
1.2.3  Procedural Rules 
One can identify three phases in the budget process: (1) the formulation of 
a budget proposal within the executive;  (2)  the presentation and approval of 
the budget in the legislature; and (3) the implementation of the budget by the 
bureaucracy. 
This paper focuses mostly on the first two aspects, although we will briefly 
touch upon the third one as well. An exhaustive treatment of the role and organ- 
ization of a bureaucracy goes beyond the scope of this paper.6 
Two issues are crucial in our view:  the voting procedures  leading to the 
formulation and approval of the budget, and the degree of transparency of the 
budget. Voting procedures  are clearly important because they establish who 
has an influence on the final budget outcome, and when. The transparency is 
equally important since “creative accounting” can circumvent even the most 
stringent voting procedures. In fact, the two issues are strictly connected: vo- 
ting procedures have an impact on the final outcome if the latter can be moni- 
tored because it is transparent. We begin with voting procedures. 
We focus upon a key trade-off between two types of institutions. One type, 
which we label, for lack of a better word, hierarchical, has the property that it 
limits the democratic accountability of  the budget process. The second type, 
which for lack of  a better word we call collegial, has the opposite features. 
Hierarchical institutions are those that, for instance, attribute strong preroga- 
tives to the prime minister (or the finance or Treasury minister) to overrule 
spending ministers within intragovernmental negotiations on the formulation 
of the budget. Hierarchical institutions also limit in a variety of ways the capac- 
ity of the legislature to amend the budget proposed by the government. Colle- 
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gial institutions emphasize the democratic rule in every stage, like the preroga- 
tives of  spending ministers within  the  government, the prerogatives of  the 
legislature vis-8-vis the government, and the rights of the minority opposition 
in the legislature. 
We  argue that there is a trade-off between these two types of  institutions: 
hierarchical institutions are more likely to enforce fiscal restraint, avoid large 
and persistent deficits, and implement fiscal adjustments more promptly. On 
the other hand, they are less respectful of the rights of the minority, and more 
likely to generate budgets heavily tilted in favor of the interests of the majority. 
Collegial institutions have the opposite features. 
This trade-off can have important positive and normative implications. From 
a positive standpoint we will argue, using the available evidence, that indeed, 
hierarchical institutions promote fiscal restraints. From a normative point of 
view we discuss what considerations should lead to a choice over this trade- 
off and how to “optimize” over it. Generally speaking, institutional choices 
close to the extremes of this institutional trade-off are unlikely to be optimal. 
Also, this institutional choice depends upon the “initial conditions.” For ex- 
ample, a country with a high debt/GDP ratio that is contemplating an institu- 
tional reform should look more favorably toward hierarchical institutions than, 
ceteris paribus, a country with a low debt/GDP ratio. The theoretical arguments 
underlying this trade-off are discussed in sections 1.3 and 1.4. 
The second important set of issues concerns the transparency of the budget 
and the nature of those institutions that are supposed to “control” the budget 
process.  Modem  budgets  of  OECD  countries  are  extremely complicated, 
sometimes unnecessarily so. One has to wonder whether the degree of com- 
plexity of a budget is unavoidable, or whether it is a way of creating opportuni- 
ties for “creative budgeting.” Typically, governments “hide” liabilities, by  ei- 
ther  shifting them  to future budgets, or  using  funds that  are “outside the 
budget.” A related common practice is that of adopting overoptimistic projec- 
tions of  macroeconomic variables,  so  that  revenues  are overestimated and 
spending needs are underestimated. Then, at the end of  the fiscal year,  “bad 
luck” is held responsible for the “unexpected” additional deficit. 
One can think of two ways of dealing with the problem of transparency. One 
is to set certain standards to be followed. The other is to have independent 
agencies that provide a “check” on the accuracy of the budget. We  will con- 
clude in  favor of  the second solution, in  section 1.5, which specifically ad- 
dresses the issue of transparency. 
1.3  Institutions, Procedures, and the Budget: Theory 
1.3.1  General Issues 
Without any restrictions on procedures, without any “structure” and rules, 
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produce a budget but only legislative “chaos.” Influential work by  Shepsle 
(1979a,b) shows that the restrictions (“structure”) imposed by procedural rules 
generally solve Arrow’s problem and lead to predictable legislative outcomes. 
A vast literature in formal political science has studied how different voting 
procedures in legislatures lead to different outcomes, and a good portion of 
this research  focuses on  the budget. Typically this  literature is inspired by 
American  institutions  and  focuses  almost  exclusively  on  the  legislature, 
namely on the American Congress. However, if viewed cum gram salis, this 
line of research can shed light on institutions of other countries. 
Much of  this research is based, directly or indirectly, upon a view of  the 
budget as the result of conflicting interests of representatives with geographi- 
cally based constituencies. In particular, it addresses two problems: the deter- 
mination of the size of the budget and the allocation of projects among differ- 
ent districts. 
Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen (1981) provide one of the clearest discus- 
sions of these issues by arguing that representatives with geographically based 
constituencies ask for spending programs that benefit their district and are fi- 
nanced nationwide. Thus, representatives systematically do not internalize the 
“true” costs of  financing such projects. The idea is that the voters of the ith 
district receive benefits for a certain public project in their district, but have to 
pay  1/N of the total costs of this project, if  N is the number of districts and if 
taxes are equally distributed among districts. A geographically elected repre- 
sentative does not fully internalize the effects of spending in his district on the 
tax burden of the country. The aggregate effect of rational representatives fac- 
ing these incentives is an excessive demand of public goods with geographi- 
cally targeted benefits and diffuse financing costs. 
While Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen do not address directly the question 
of how all of these demands for pork barrel projects lead to an aggregate bud- 
get, the critical feature of a voting equilibrium that leads to an oversupply of 
pork barrel projects is “reciprocity.” Namely, a representative of the ith district 
votes in favor of a project for districtj, expecting the same favor in return from 
the representative of district in the next vote. 
The literature on procedures has addressed three related questions: what pro- 
cedural rules mitigate or aggravate the problem of  oversupply of  pork barrel 
projects? What procedural rules make the choice of  projects, given a certain 
total budget, more or less efficient? How do different procedural rules influ- 
ence the final allocation of net benefits among districts? Two issues are particu- 
larly interesting for our purposes: (a)  the sequence of  voting on the budget, 
and (b)  the type of admissible amendments on the proposed budget. 
1.3.2  Timing of Voting on the Budget 
One of the most important features of the Budget Act of  1974 in the United 
States, which substantially reformed budget procedures, was to change the se- 
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on a series of appropriation bills, and the overall size of the budget was deter- 
mined residually. After the Budget Act, Congress is required to vote at the 
beginning of the process on the overall size of the budget. The motivation of 
this reform was to enforce an ex ante discipline on the legislature, so as to fix 
an agreed-upon overall size of the budget, rather than letting it be determined 
by  the accumulation of  bills. The emergence of large budget deficits in the 
eighties raises some questions concerning the success of this reform.’ 
Motivated by  this puzzle, Ferejohn and Krehbiel (1987) study theoretically 
the determination of  the size of the budget under the two alternative voting 
procedures. They assume that the budget can be allocated to two projects and 
different legislators have different preferences for the relative benefits of these 
two projects. These authors reach a rather provocative conclusion: It is not 
always the case that the size of the budget is smaller when the legislatures vote 
first on the size and then on the composition, relative to the case in which the 
overall budget size is determined as a residual. While the size of the budget is 
in general nor independent of the order of votes, the relative size of the budget 
with different orders of votes depends on the distribution of legislatures’ pref- 
erences for budget composition. The same issue has been revisited recently by 
Hallerberg and von Hagen (1997). 
The critical intuition of  these results is that rational legislators should be 
forward looking: for example, when voting on the first item of the budget, they 
will calculate how their first vote will affect the final outcome both in terms of 
size and of  composition. Conversely, when voting on the size first, rational 
legislators can compute how a certain size will then lead to a certain composi- 
tion in the following vote. These results are obtained with the assumption of 
perfect information-each  legislator knows the distribution of preferences of 
the legislatures. Thus, at the moment of the first vote, the legislators can com- 
pute the final voting equilibrium. While this assumption is clearly not realistic, 
it is not obvious in which direction the results would change if one allowed for 
imperfect information. 
An unfortunate feature of these results is that they cannot really illuminate 
the question of  which of  the two procedures one should choose to limit the 
spending bias of legislatures. In fact, it is hard to derive a simple link between 
certain observable characteristics of  the distribution of  legislatures’ prefer- 
ences and the policy outcomes under the two different procedures. Thus, one 
should read these papers as a very useful warning against oversimplifying the 
effect of certain procedures on final outcomes. 
1.3.3  Amendment Rules 
In an influential series of papers, Baron (1989, 1991) and Baron and Fere- 
john (1989) study the question of how legislatures reach agreement on how to 
7. Naturally, one may argue that fiscal discipline  in the  United States would have been even 
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choose pork barrel projects. Specifically, they study both how the legislature 
chooses the allocation of benefits of a certain budget among legislators repre- 
senting different districts and how the legislature chooses among different bud- 
gets, more or less efficiently. 
This line of research emphasizes a distinction between closed rules and open 
rules in  amendments. A closed rule is one in  which a proposal made by  a 
member of  the legislature has to be voted immediately up or down. If  it is 
approved, the “game is over”; if it is rejected, a new member of  the legislature 
can make another proposal, which again is voted up or down. An open rule is 
one in which the proposal made by the member selected is subject to amend- 
ments on the floor. 
In actual legislatures the agenda setter in the budget process is the govern- 
ment. Thus, closed rules attribute more power to the government and less to 
the floor of the legislature. The result is that closed rules are more hierarchical. 
The implication is that with  closed rules budgets  are approved  rapidly  and 
typically reflect more closely the preference of the government. On the other 
hand, the preferences of various minority groups in the legislatures are taken 
into account less, precisely because the procedures are less collegial. 
In practice, closed rules are those that make it impossible for the legislature 
to amend the size of  the deficit; that is, if  the  legislature wants to increase 
spending, it also has to increase taxes. Even more stringent procedures make 
it impossible for the legislature to increase not only the deficit, but even total 
spending. In this case the legislature can only change the allocation of spend- 
ing and revenues, but not their total. 
The discussion about the possible amendments of the legislature highlights 
very clearly several aspects of the trade-off between hierarchical and collegial 
procedures. With a closed rule you achieve quick approval of a proposal, at the 
cost of implementing “unfair”  budgets. Budgets are unfair in the sense that 
they are tilted in favor of those who make the first proposal, and always distrib- 
ute benefits to the smallest possible majority. 
Two implications on the choice of rules follow. First, a closed rule is prefera- 
ble if  avoiding delays is an important consideration. This is likely to be the 
case in high-debt  countries and/or in periods  of macroeconomic  instability, 
when the rapid adoption of fiscal adjustments is critical. On the other hand, in 
countries and time periods of  low debt and fiscal stability, considerations of 
allocative efficiency and fairness may be predominant, leading to the adoption 
of an open rule. 
1.3.4  An Analogy with Electoral Laws 
Before closing this section it is useful to highlight an analogy between the 
trade-off between collegial and hierarchical  institutions and the trade-off be- 
tween proportional  and majoritarian  electoral systems. Proportional electoral 
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Majoritarian systems tend to produce biparty systems (or some approximation 
of  them) and single-party governments. Coalition governments are the ana- 
logue of collegial procedures: they generate delays in policymaking but avoid 
extreme partisanship. In fact, coalition governments require approval of several 
parties to govern, and the veto power of each coalition member can delay the 
legislative process. Majoritarian systems have the opposite features, since they 
imply that, when in office, a party is unconstrained. Alesina and Drazen (1991) 
and Spolaore (1993) provide formalization of these ideas. Grilli, Masciandaro, 
and  Tabellini  (1991),  Roubini  and  Sachs  (1989a,b), Alesina  and  Perotti 
(1995a), Perotti and Kontopoulos (chap. 4  in this volume) and Hallerberg and 
von Hagen (chap. 9 in this volume) discuss empirical evidence on fiscal dead- 
locks and delayed fiscal adjustments in coalition governments in OECD coun- 
tries. A related discussion refers to “divided government” in the United States, 
which occurs when the party of the president does not hold a majority in Con- 
gress. This situation can be a source of policy delays but also of policy modera- 
tion, as argued theoretically and empirically by Alesina and Rosenthal(l995). 
In summary, the choice of an electoral law implies an institutional trade-off 
that is very similar to the one that we have highlighted for budget procedures. 
1.4  Discussion 
The formal literature discussed above has made important progress in ana- 
lyzing legislatures in general and the U.S. Congress in particular. For those, 
like us, who are interested in the effects of procedures on budget deficits in a 
comparative perspective, this literature leaves several questions open. 
1. First, this literature addresses specifically the size and the geographical 
composition of the budget, while it is silent on the budget balance. One needs 
a dynamic model in order to analyze deficits, while the models reviewed so far 
are static. The technical difficulty lies in the fact that in a dynamic model each 
legislative vote determines the state of  the world (in particular the level of 
public debt) inherited by the following legislature, or the following vote by the 
same legislature. Thus, rational legislators should vote today taking into ac- 
count the effects of  their decision on future voting equilibria, with different 
levels of  debt. This problem is hard to solve, except in very simple models 
where the complexity of procedural rules and of the composition of the legisla- 
ture is vastly simplified.8 
Chari and Cole (1993) make some progress in this direction, by considering 
together  the insights of  Weingast,  Shepsle, and  Johnsen  (198 l), reviewed 
above, and the point made by Alesina and Tabellini (1990). The latter suggest 
that public debt can be used “strategically” by today’s policymaker to influence 
8. For example, see Alesina and Tabellini 1990, Persson and Svensson 1989, and Tabellini and 
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the choice of  tomorrow’s policymaker  if the two policymakers  (today’s and 
tomorrow’s) have different spending priorities. Chari and Cole consider a legis- 
lature with the kind of bias emphasized by Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen and 
show how this legislature will choose to issue debt to spend as much as pos- 
sible in the first period. The reason for the high-spendinghigh-debt policy is a 
combination of the “district bias” argument and the “strategic debt” argument. 
Velasco (chap. 2 in this volume) uses a model based on the “tragedy of the 
commons” framework and studies a noncooperative game between multiple 
spending  authorities drawing on a common  amount of tax  revenues. All of 
these spending authorities attempt to free ride on common public resources 
(tax revenues) to spend on the desired program. 
In summary, one has to choose between  models that are relatively rich in 
institutional details but are static and dynamic models that are poor in institu- 
tional realism. For the empirical and policy-oriented researcher this is a serious 
problem, since results on the size of spending do not necessarily translate into 
results on the size of deficits. In fact, one can point to examples of countries 
(e.g., France) with a large government sector, but a low level of public debt. 
2. The second limitation of this literature lies in its emphasis on pork barrel 
projects, that is, on public projects with geographically concentrated benefits. 
While this emphasis was empirically grounded two decades ago, it has been 
less and less so in recent years. As argued above, the share of OECD budgets 
devoted  to projects  that  can be  considered  pork  barrel  and  geographically 
based  is shrinking relative  to transfer programs  and entitlement,  which are 
broadly based. Clearly, some transfer programs have a geographical base-for 
instance, Florida has a high concentration of pensioners; disability pensions 
have been used in Italy as an indirect transfer from the north to the ~0~1th.~ 
However, the emphasis placed by this formal literature on pork barrel projects 
is disproportionate  relative to the current relevance of  these projects in  the 
budget. In fact, Alesina and Perotti (1995a) argue that the recent experience of 
fiscal adjustments in OECD countries shows that successful and long-lasting 
fiscal  consolidations  cannot  avoid cuts  in  entitlement,  broad-based  transfer 
programs, and government wages and employment. Formal models of legisla- 
tive votes on pork barrel projects cannot be directly applied to questions of 
spending allocation to transfer programs,  social security, and entitlement in 
general. 
3. A third problem is the almost exclusive emphasis of this literature on the 
legislature, with reasonably little attention to the executive.  lo One can argue 
that this emphasis is justified for the case of the United States, but, in our view, 
it is beyond doubt that one needs to focus more on the formulation of budget 
within the government in parliamentary democracies. Particularly in situations 
where the role of the legislature is limited in how it can amend the budget 
9.  See Emerson 1988 for data on this point. 
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proposed by the executive, intragovernment  negotiations can be very important 
for the final outcome. 
Some of  the literature on  committees, procedural rules, order of  voting, 
closed versus open rules, can be applied mutatis mutandis to the decision pro- 
cess within the government. For example, our previous discussion on the order 
of  voting (on the overall size first and the composition later) could be well 
applied to voting within a cabinet of ministers. 
However, several additional issues arise when we consider the budget for- 
mation within the executive in parliamentary democracies. For instance, one 
crucial factor is the relative position, de jure or de facto, of the spending min- 
isters versus the Treasury minister and/or the prime minister. Specifically, the 
issue is whether the person who is ultimately responsible for presenting the 
budget to the legislature (typically the Treasury minister) has a higher standing 
in the intragovernment budget negotiations relative to the spending ministers. 
In some cases, more than one person is responsible for the preparation of the 
budget. In what follows, we indicate with Treasury minister the person(s) re- 
sponsible for the overall budget. More hierarchical procedures grant to the 
Treasury minister higher standing relative to spending ministers, while more 
collegial procedures are more egalitarian, within the government. The constitu- 
encies of  spending ministers are groups and industries who benefit from cer- 
tain spending programs, while, at least in theory, the constituency of the Trea- 
sury minister is the “average” taxpayer. Thus the spending ministers do not 
internalize the aggregate costs of certain spending programs, while the Trea- 
sury has an incentive to internalize. 
One can think of  an analogy with the case of the United States. Spending 
ministers are like congressmen, whose constituencies favor specific spending 
programs. The president in the United States and the Treasury minister in par- 
liamentary democracies, should be more sensitive to the broad-based interests 
of the average taxpayer. Chari, Jones, and Marimon (1997) provide an interest- 
ing formalization of this idea for the case of the United States. They argue that 
the American voters often prefer to elect a “big spender” (i.e., a Democrat) 
in their legislative district, but a “fiscal conservative” (i.e., a Republican) as 
president. By doing so, these voters maximize their chances of bringing spend- 
ing to their districts while keeping the overall size of the budget, thus the level 
of taxes, low.” The analogy with parliamentary governments is that the voters 
should favor “generous” spending ministers and a conservative Treasury min- 
ister. 
The incentives for “spending ministers” to increase the size of the budget 
are even stronger if we consider their role as heads of a bureaucracy. We know 
from the work  by  Niskanen  (1971) and of  the “public choice school” (see 
11. A devil’s advocate may note that Democratic presidents are sometimes elected and that the 
Republican administrations in the eighties were far from “fiscally conservative” in a traditional 
sense. The November 1994 midterm election produced a configuration of divided government that 
is opposite from the one predicted by Chari, Jones, and Mariman 1997. 24  Albert0 Alesina and Roberto Perotti 
Mueller 1978 for a review) that bureaucracies strive to maximize their budget 
allocation. In fact the status, salary, and influence of bureaucrats is often posi- 
tively correlated with the size of the budget that they manage.12 
In summary, any procedural arrangement that increases the relative power 
of the Treasury minister is likely to increase fiscal discipline. 
4. A fourth set of  issues that assumes somewhat different features in the 
American context and in parliamentary democracies is the relationship be- 
tween executive and legislature in the budget process. Typically, both in the 
United States and in parliamentary democracies, legislators are viewed as big 
spenders, trying to undermine the attempt of governments to be more fiscally 
responsible. Thus, as argued above, procedures that limit the type of amend- 
ments that the legislature can propose should lead to fiscal restraint, at the cost 
of less collegiality. An important procedural aspect concerns the consequences 
of a rejection of the budget proposed by the executive. The consequences could 
be very “serious,” implying de jure or de facto the resignation of  the govern- 
ment and even new elections. On the opposite extreme, the consequences can 
be very “mild,” simply requiring a new budget proposal from the executive. 
Von  Hagen (1992) argues that the more “serious” for the government are 
the consequences of a parliamentary defeat on the budget, “the more it is in 
government’s interest to propose a budget that can be expected to find a solid 
majority in parliament” (von Hagen 1992, 35). On the other hand, the legisla- 
ture and, in particular, the parties supporting the government may refrain from 
defeating a budget proposal for fear of  creating an institutional crisis. Which 
of the two arguments prevails may depend on the circumstances. Generally, if 
the government can choose “what is at stake” in any given vote on the budget, 
it achieves a strategic advantage, turning a vote for or against the budget into 
a vote for or against the government. This choice may  be helpful to  “bring 
to order” parliamentary debates where members of the parties in government 
threaten to vote with the opposition on the budget. For instance, Huber (1992) 
discusses these types of procedures (the guillotine and the package vote) for 
the case of France. He argues that these procedures are used quite frequently 
in the Fifth Republic and were introduced as a response to the cabinet fragility 
of  the Fourth Republic. He suggests that the use of these procedures signifi- 
cantly helped the executive to pass the desired legislation, and these procedures 
were often used within the budget approval process. 
5. In section 1.3.3, we discussed the relative merits of closed and open rules, 
but several additional issues are left open. In particular, the open-rule regime 
can be of  very different types. For instance, amendments can be permissible 
only if they do not increase the size of the deficit, or if they do not increase the 
size of spending. For instance, one can think of a closed rule on the size of the 
12. Fiorina and No11  (1978) discuss the interaction of  bureaucrats interested in increasing the 
size of  the budget and legislators interested in  increasing the size of  pork barrel programs for 
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budget, and an open rule on its composition. This would strengthen the posi- 
tion of  the executive when needed to implement fiscal adjustments, but pre- 
serve collegiality on purely allocative issues. Theoretical work on these points 
is not yet available. 
1.5  lkansparency of the Budget 
The budgets of modem economies are very complex, sometimes unneces- 
sarily so. This complexity, partly unavoidable, partly artificially created, helps 
in various practices that “hide” the real balance (current and future) of  costs 
and benefits for the taxpayers. Politicians have incentives to hide taxes, over- 
emphasize the benefits of spending, and hide government liabilities (the equiv- 
alent of future taxes). Politicians have little incentive to produce simple, clear, 
and transparent budgets. 
At least two theoretical arguments support this claim. The first, the theory 
of “fiscal illusion,” is illustrated particularly clearly by  Buchanan and Wagner 
(1977). According to this view, the voters typically overestimate the benefits 
of public spending and underestimate the costs of taxation, current and future. 
Lack of transparency of the budget can increase the voters’ confusion and re- 
duce politicians’ incentives to be fiscally responsible. Elsewhere (Alesina and 
Perotti 1995b) we have raised some doubts about the role of fiscal illusion as 
the main explanation of large and persistent deficits, such as those of countries 
with debt/GDP ratios of  100 percent or more. However, lack of  transparency 
and voters’ confusion can certainly interfere negatively with effective budget 
control, particularly when substantial fiscal adjustments are needed. 
The second argument does not rely on voters’ irrationality and confusion. 
Several papers, although in different contexts (e.g., Cukierman and Meltzer 
1986;  Alesina and Cukierman 1990), highlight the benefit for policymakers of 
a certain amount of ambiguity even when they face a rational electorate. The 
idea is that by creating confusion and, in particular, by making it less clear how 
policies translate into outcomes, policymakers can retain a strategic advantage 
versus rational, but not fully informed, voters. This advantage would disappear 
with “transparent” procedures; therefore, the policymakers would often choose 
to adopt ambiguous procedures. In particular, at least up to a point, the less 
the electorate knows and understands about the budget process, the more the 
politicians can act strategically and use fiscal deficits and overspending to 
achieve opportunistic goals. 
Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990) make a similar point in the 
context of political business cycle models. They show that if the voters cannot 
easily observe the composition of  the budget (on the spending or on the fi- 
nancing side), then policymakers can follow loose fiscal policies before elec- 
tions and increase their chances of reappointment. 
The literature reviewed in this section makes interesting points. However, it 
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literature on voting procedures reviewed in section  1.3. Once the policymak- 
ers’ incentives to be strategically ambiguous are well understood, one is left 
with  the rather  difficult  task  of  understanding  how, in reality, policymakers 
obfuscate the budget and what to do about it. The only paper that attempts to 
explicitly model the role of ambiguity and lack of transparency in the budget 
process is Milesi-Ferretti 1997.  This author shows that politicians who want to 
run excessive deficits would choose nontransparent procedures, and the latter 
would help them achieve their (distorted) goals. 
In practice a variety of tricks can serve the purpose of strategically influenc- 
ing the beliefs and information of  taxpayerslvoters. For instance: 
1. Overestimate the expected growth of the economy, so as to overestimate 
tax revenues, and underestimate the level of interest rates, so as to underesti- 
mate outlays. At the end of the fiscal year, the  “unexpected”  deficit can be 
attributed to unforeseen macroeconomic developments, for which the govern- 
ment can claim a lack of responsibility. 
2.  Project overly optimistic forecasts of the effect on the budget of  various 
policies, so that, for instance, a small new tax is forecasted to have major reve- 
nue effects, thus postponing to the following budget the problem of a real ad- 
justment. 
3. Keep various items off budget, with a creative use of the budget of  other 
public organizations not incorporated in the national budget. 
4.  Use budget projections strategically. For example, in all the discussions 
about future budgets, a key element is the “baseline.” By inflating the baseline, 
politicians can claim to be fiscally conservative without having to create real 
costs for the constituencies. In this way, they create an illusion: they appear 
conservative in the eyes of the taxpayers, worried about the size of the budget, 
but they do not really hurt key constituencies with spending cuts. Clearly, this 
illusion cannot last forever, since adjustment rigorous only relative to inflated 
baseline in the end will not stop the growth of the debt. However, this proce- 
dure creates confusion  and, at the very least, delays the electorate’s realistic 
perception of the actual state of public finance. 
5.  Strategic use of multiyear budgeting.  By announcing  a, say, three-year 
adjustment plan in which all the hard policies occur in years two and three, 
politicians can look responsible and can buy time; then they can revise the next 
three-year budget policies to further postpone the hard choices. 
Tanzi (1  995) compares budget institutions in several OECD countries and 
emphasizes the role of transparency  and how different countries  show very 
different levels of it. This author relates the degree of transparency with the 
feasibility of expenditure control.I3 
13. Both Tanzi (1995) and Alesina, Mare, and Perotti (1996) argue that Italy has one of the least 
transparent procedures, if not the least transparent, in the OECD group of countries. These authors 
agree that lack of transparency has made expenditure control in Italy particularly difficult. In fact, 
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How to increase budget transparency is a difficult problem. We  can think 
of three possibilities. The first and most commonly followed is a “legalistic” 
approach. That is, more and more rules and regulations are imposed on how 
the budget should be prepared, organized, and executed. This approach is un- 
likely  to be  successful: complicated rules  and  regulations provide  fertile 
ground for nontransparent budget procedures. A second alternative is to create 
legislative bodies in charge of evaluating the transparency, accuracy, and pro- 
jections of the government budget.I4 This approach is superior to the legalistic 
one, but it relies heavily on the political independence of  this public body. 
This independence may be problematic, particularly in a parliamentary system 
where the government parties control a majority in the legislature.  A third alter- 
native, the most radical but the most effective, is to delegate to a respected 
private institution the task of  verifying the accuracy and transparency of the 
budget process. In  addition, the government budget should be based on an 
average of the economic forecasts of and projections derived by  international 
organizations or private institutions, in order to avoid strategic manipulations 
of forecasts. 
1.6  Budget Procedures and Fiscal Outcomes: Empirical Evidence 
Von Hagen ( 1992) and von Hagen and Harden (  1994) provide the first com- 
prehensive empirical analysis of the effects of procedures on fiscal outcomes 
in European countries. They construct several indices, which are meant to rank 
fiscal procedures from the most hierarchical to the most collegial, using our 
terminology. Their sample is given by  all the member countries of the Euro- 
pean Community, and they focus on a wide range of  information on budget 
procedures: 
1. the government preparation of a budget 
2. the legislative phase and the relationship between executive and legis- 
3. the implementation phase 
4.  the degree of transparency of the budget 
5. the existence of numerical targets (balanced-budget laws, etc.) 
6. the existence of multiyear budgeting 
lature 
They show that budget arrangements vary widely among EU countries, and 
this is encouraging for the theory, since debt/GNP ratios also are very different 
across these countries. 
As for the government phase of budget preparation, they identify three types 
of procedures, which using our terminology we can call hierarchical, interme- 
diate, and collegial. The key variable on which they focus is the relative posi- 
tion of the Treasury mini~ter’~  vis-2-vis the spending ministers. Interestingly, 
14. An example could be something like the Congressional Budget Office in the United States. 
15. Or of the minister(s) responsible for the preparation of the budget. 28  Albert0 Alesina and Roberto Perotti 
Table 1.1  Public Debt in OECD Countries 

































































































Note:  Debt is gross as a share of GNP. 
a 1970. 
they argue that France and the United Kingdom are the clearest examples of 
the hierarchical procedural type. The “superiority” of the prime minister and 
the finance minister in France is formally established. In the case of the United 
Kingdom, the “superiority” of the Treasury is more de facto, and is based on 
seniority and accepted practice. Von Hagen and Harden (1994) write that “In 
France  the  strong  position  of  the  Prime  Minister  in  budgetary  matters  is 
grounded in the constitution.. . . [Tlhe British Chancellor of  the Exchequer 
. . . derives most of  his power from seniority and historical convention, the 
British equivalent of constitutions law” (340). It is interesting to note that nei- 
ther of  these countries has a debt problem despite a very large public sector 
(France), and relatively low rate of economic growth in the last two decades 
(England). At the opposite extreme we find countries where the Treasury min- 
ister has no special status, including Ireland, Italy, Belgium, Greece, Luxem- 
bourg, and Portugal. The reader will recognize in the first three countries those 
that, at least until the early nineties, have had the highest debt/GNP ratios in 
the OECD, and in the other three countries cases of rapidly rising debt/GNP 
ratios (see table 1.1). 
The authors also look at the structure of negotiations, ranking as more colle- 
gial countries where the negotiations are not bilateral between Treasury and 
each spending minister, but cabinet-wide. According to this indicator the most 29  Budget Deficits and Budget Institutions 
collegial countries are Greece, Ireland, and Spain, and the most hierarchical 
are France, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. 
As a matter of fact, it is not clear a priori which of the two procedures is 
more conducive to fiscal discipline. On the one hand, Alt and Chrystal(l981) 
argue, with an eye on the British case, that bilateral negotiations give an oppor- 
tunity to individual spending ministers to “strike deals” with the Treasury so 
that, in the end, the budget is inflated by the accumulation of these bilateral 
deals since no spending minister has the opportunity or the desire to “attack” 
another spending minister’s deal. On the other hand, multilateral negotiations 
create an opportunity for the spending ministers to form a coalition “against” 
the Treasury. Also, as von  Hagen (  1992) emphasizes, multilateral bargaining 
creates an opportunity for reciprocity between spending ministers, namely in- 
centive to favor each other’s spending programs. On balance, we agree with 
von Hagen (1 993) that bilateral negotiations are more likely to encourage fiscal 
discipline than multilateral ones. However, Perotti and Kontopoulos (chap. 4 
in this volume) reach inconclusive empirical results on a sample of  OECD 
countries. 
As for the legislative phase, these authors look at the restrictions on amend- 
ments, and at the agenda-setting power of the executive, that is, what the gov- 
ernment can do to influence voting in the legislature. For example, they focus 
on what types of amendments are possible from the floor of the legislature and 
what the restrictions are (if any) on amendments that increase the deficit or the 
size of  spending proposed  by  the government. Classifying  countries along 
these dimensions is not always straightforward. For instance, France is a clear 
example of an authoritarian procedure. According to the authors, Italy, Greece, 
and Denmark “have procedures  which are characterized  by  comparable de- 
grees of openness.”  I6 
As for the implementation phase, they consider the degree of control that 
the Treasury minister has on spending, how easy it is to increase actual spend- 
ing over the planned level, and how flexible are transfers of spending from one 
chapter to another. Interestingly, France appears, once again, as the country 
with the most restrictive procedures. 
The transparency of the budget is measured by a variety of indicators, from 
responses to interviews (see von Hagen 1992, 71) to the existence of “special 
funds” in the budget, to the presentation of the budget in a single document, 
and  so forth.  Interestingly, Italy  and Ireland,  current and former high-debt 
countries, respectively, have the least transparent budgets. 
Von  Hagen (1992) finds support for what he calls the “structural hypothe- 
sis,” namely that budgetary procedures that are more hierarchical (in our termi- 
nology) lead to greater fiscal discipline. This result is based on correlations 
16. Actually, our reading of the Italian case is a bit different. Using their own criteria, we would 
have classified Italy at the very least in the intermediate group, if not in the hierarchical one. See 
Alesina, Mare, and Perotti 1996 for more discussion. 30  Alberto Alesina and Roberto Perotti 
between various aggregate indices of budget procedures and fiscal policy mea- 
sures in his sample of European countries. These indices summarize in numeri- 
cal scale all the information discussed above, and they turn out to be strongly 
correlated with cross-country differences in debt/GNP ratios and budget defi- 
cits in the eighties. Von  Hagen and Harden (1994) also consider other fiscal 
indicators of fiscal policy, such as debt sustainability, the growth of open-ended 
programs, and the role of fiscal policy in macroeconomic stabilization. Inter- 
estingly, concerning the last issue, they find that countries with more hierarchi- 
cal institutions do not show worse performance in terms of output stabilization, 
despite their more fiscally conservative policies.” 
These aggregate indices squeeze into a single number several different fea- 
tures of the budget process. Thus, different countries may receive similar ag- 
gregate values of the indices for very different reasons. For instance, in von 
Hagen’s work, France and Germany have high indexes (high meaning more 
hierarchical procedures) for different reasons. In France the high value of the 
index is due mostly  to the strong role of  the prime minister and its voting 
rules; in Germany it is mostly due to the transparency of the budget and the 
inflexibility of implementation. On the other hand, Italy receives a low score 
mostly for the weak role of the Treasury minister and the lack of transparency 
of the budget; Belgium receives a low score because of its voting procedures. 
De Haan, Moessen, and Volkerink (chap. 11 in this volume) make progress 
in disentangling the effects of different components of these indices in a sam- 
ple of European countries. They conclude that the position of the minister of 
finance is especially important. Case studies can also shed light on which as- 
pects of budget procedures are more important. Examples of research in this 
vein include Alesina, Mare, and Perotti  1996 on Italy; Campos and Pradhan 
(chap. 10 in this volume) on Australia and New Zealand; Courchene (chap. 12 
in this volume) on Canada and Australia; Feld and Kirchgassner (chap. 7 in 
this volume) on Switzerland; and Wright 1997 on Japan, the United Kingdom, 
and Canada. 
Several authors have also investigated the role of fiscal institutions in Latin 
America. Alesina et al. (1996) consider a sample of almost all the Latin Ameri- 
can countries and construct an index of budget procedures on a hierarchical- 
collegial dimension, and on a transparent-nontransparent  one. They use both 
the written legislation and a survey conducted by means of questionnaires an- 
swered by the budget director’s office of each country. The index is related but 
far from identical to the one constructed by von Hagen for OECD countries. 
The index by Alesina et al. focuses on several critical aspects: (a)  whether or 
not the budget is approved in the context of a binding macroeconomic pro- 
gram; (b)  the role of the Treasury minister, de jure or de facto, as the agenda 
17. This result is reminiscent of  findings concerning central bank independence. Alesina and 
Summers (1993) show that in OECD countries more independent central banks show lower infla- 
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setter in the budget process; (c) the relationship between the government and 
the legislature in the budget process; (d)  the voting procedure in the legislature; 
and (e)  various proxies for the degree of  transparency of  the budget. These 
authors find that for a sample from 1980 to 1993, more hierarchicaYtransparent 
procedures are associated with lower primary deficits in Latin America, after 
controlling for several economic determinants of the government budget. They 
also attempt to disentangle which aspects of the budget procedures are more 
important than others. For a variety of reasons, their results are not conclusive 
on this point; however, it would seem that a particularly important aspect is the 
fact that the budget outcomes (particularly the deficit) are discussed and de- 
cided in the context of a binding macroeconomic program for the year. 
Gavin and Perotti (1997) and Stein, Talvi, and Grisanti (chap. 5 in this vol- 
ume) provide vast and comprehensive assessments of several aspects of Latin 
America's fiscal performance in the last few decades. Among others, they em- 
phasize issues of procyclicality of fiscal policy, composition of spending, rela- 
tionship between central and local governments, and transparency of the bud- 
get.  They  conclude  that  institutions are  important  determinants of  fiscal 
outcomes in this region. Jones, Sanguinetti, and Tommasi (chap. 6 in this vol- 
ume) focus on Argentina and discuss the institutional relationship between 
central and provincial governments. This is indeed a critical factor for the 
maintenance of fiscal discipline in this country. 
An important point that should receive further attention is the interaction 
of budget institutions with other political variables. One problem in pursuing 
this research is the number of degrees of freedom. Since this empirical work 
is almost exclusively cross-sectional in nature, one needs several countries in 
the sample to investigate several institutional characteristics, and their interac- 
tion together. Perotti and Kontopoulos (chap. 4 in this volume), Hallerberg and 
von Hagen (1997 and chap. 9 in this volume), and de Haan and Sturm (1994, 
1997) have made some progress along this line, focusing on OECD country 
samples. 
A vast related literature that can also shed light on the effect of budget proce- 
dures on outcome focuses on American states, which provide a sample with a 
large variance in institutional arrangement and fiscal performance. Several re- 
cent papers by  Poterba (1994), Alt and Lowry (1994), Bayoumi and Eichen- 
green (1995), Bohn and Inman (1995), Inman (1996), Kiewiet and Szakaly 
(1996), and Alesina and Bayoumi (1996), among others, are particularly rele- 
vant for our discussion.18 
For instance, Poterba (1994) focuses on fiscal shocks, namely the difference 
between planned and actual spending and revenues, due to a variety of unex- 
pected random events. While many states cannot plan to run deficits, unex- 
pected deficits as a result of  fiscal shocks can and do materialize. American 
states have rather different provisions concerning state balance, that is, differ- 
18. See also earlier work by von Hagen (1991). 32  Alberto Alesina and Roberto Perotti 
ent budget laws. The Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations (1987) 
scales them  from 1 to  10 in terms of  how  restrictive they  are for the  state 
budget balance. Poterba studies whether the different degrees of stringency of 
budget balance provisions affect the reaction of states to fiscal shocks. He finds 
that states with weak antideficit rules adjust spending less in response to posi- 
tive deficit shocks than their counterparts with strict antideficit laws. More gen- 
erally he concludes that “fiscal institutions affect the short-run patterns of taxes 
and expenditures”  (801). Interestingly, Poterba also finds that adjustments to 
adverse fiscal shocks are less vigorous and prompt in states with divided gov- 
ernment, where the governor does not belong to the party that holds a majority 
in the legislature. Alt and Lowry (1  994), using a somewhat different approach 
and sample, reach very similar conclusions. They find that adjustments to fiscal 
imbalances  are low  in states with divided  government  and weak antideficit 
rules. Alesina  and Bayoumi  (1996) show that  while  restrictions  on  budget 
deficits enforce fiscal balance, they do  not have observable costs on state prod- 
uct variability, for lack of fiscal stabilization. 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1995) find that the response of deficits to income 
fluctuations is stronger in states with less stringent budget rules. These authors 
find that in states with tough rules, most of the budget adjustments occur on 
the spending side, suggesting that stringent rules are effective at containing 
spending. These authors  make a distinction  between  those balanced-budget 
rules  that  require  only  a  prospective  or beginning-of-the-year  balance  and 
those that require an end-of-the-year balance. They find that soft, beginning- 
of-the-year constraints are much less effective than the tougher end-of-the-year 
ones at controlling deficits. These results are quite intriguing, and they relate 
to the issue of transparency  discussed  above. Clearly, beginning-of-the-year 
requirements leave open the possibility of  strategic use of projections and ac- 
counting to make a budget look balanced in theory but not with realistic fore- 
casts of revenues and spending needs. 
Several other authors have studied the effects on state budgets of gubemato- 
rial line-item veto. The latter does not impose caps on state spending or deficits 
but, at least theoretically, tilts the relative power in favor of the governor against 
the legislature in the budget process. As a result, in principle, the line-item veto 
should promote fiscal discipline. American states differ: many have the line- 
item veto, several do not. They also differ on what majority is required in the 
legislature to overcome a gubernatorial veto. Clearly, the higher the majority 
required, the stronger the governor’s relative power. As pointed out in the sur- 
vey by Carter and Schap (1990), the empirical effects of  the line-item veto on 
state budgets are unclear.  Holtz-Eakin  (1988), for instance, finds that in the 
long run the presence of the line-item veto does not reduce spending or deficits. 
However, in the short run it has some effect, depending on the political context 
and, in particular, the party affiliation of the governor and the composition of 
the legislature. Alm and Evers (1991) describe similar findings and conclude 33  Budget Deficits and Budget Institutions 
that the line-item veto has a small negative effect on the level of  spending in 
the case of divided state government. Similar results are reached by  Bohn and 
Inman (1995).19 
Broadly speaking, one is struck by the similarity of some of the results be- 
tween American states and OECD countries. First, in both cases, budget defi- 
cits seem to be the result of delayed fiscal adjustments of fragmented govern- 
ments  (coalition governments in  OECD countries, divided government in 
American states). Second, budget institutions influence budget outcomes in the 
expected direction. Third, perhaps more hierarchical institutions are particu- 
larly necessary and useful in situations of government fragmentation. 
Also, one may note an analogy between the effect of budget institutions and 
government structure. Collegial institutions and fragmented governments do 
not cause budget deficits per se, but delay adjustments to fiscal imbalances that 
appear, for any reason. Thus, questions concerning both the timing of deficits 
and the cross-country differences can be answered by the interaction between, 
on the one hand, the shocks in the seventies, lower growth, and demographic 
factors that posed a heavy burden on social security systems and, on the other 
hand, certain budget procedures and fragmented government. 
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